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Abstract 
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Against the view insisting that separation of religion and state is a Western phenomenon, 
foreign to Islamic culture, I examine a Turkish case for separation, a case made by Ziya 
Gökalp (1876-1924), who argued that the Islamic separation model is closer to 
Protestant separation models than to French secularism. My first conclusion is that 
Gökalp’s separation shows the distinctive philosophical reflection to affirm separation 
from within his religion, and therefore it is closer to American separation model, which 
allows religious citizens to translate their religious views into the public language 
accessible to all parties—either religious or secular—in public sphere. From the first 
conclusion, a corollary follows: the claim concerning the absence of separation outside 
the West needs to be questioned insofar as Gökalp’s Islamic separation is similar with 
American separation model. Second, Gökalp’s own comparative claim about the 
Western church-state relations, if it is read with other comparative arguments 
concerning separation, shows that separation has the multiple fronts of conceptual 
contestation. 
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Ö z 
 
Subject: Ziya Gökalp'in din ve devlet ayrımı: Amerikan ve Fransız modelleriyle bir 
karşılaştırma 
 
 
Daeil Chun 
 
Siyaset bilimi yüksek lisans tezi 2015 
 
Tez danışmanı: Dr. Nedim Nomer 
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Dİn ve devlet ayrımı, laiklik, Zİya Gökalp, düşünce tarihi 
 
 
Bu tezde din ve devletin ayrılmasının, İslami kültüre yabancı, bir Batı fenomeni olduğu 
fikrine karşı Ziya Gökalp'in savunduğu, Fransız modelindense Protestan modeline daha 
yakın, İslami bir model incelenecektir. Tezde varılan ilk sonuç Gökalp'in bu ayrımı 
dinin içinde temellendiren, dindar vatandaşlara dini görüşlerini laik veya dindar tüm 
vatandaşlara açık olan kamu alanında ve kamu dilinde ifade edip duyurma imkanı veren 
Amerikan modeline yakın olan, felsefi düşünceyi desteklediği şeklindedir. İlk sonucun 
devamında varılan çıkarım din-devlet ayrımının Batı dışında olmaması iddiası Gökalp'in 
İslami ayrımının Amerikan modeline yakın olduğu ölçüde sorgulanması gerektiği 
şeklindedir. Varılan diğer sonuç ise Gökalp'in Batı'daki kilise-devlet ilişkileriyle ilgili 
karşilaştırmalı iddiasının, eğer ayrımla ilgili diğer karşılaştırmalı iddialarla beraber 
okunursa, ayrımla ilgili kavramsal tartışmanın çok yönlü olduğunu gösterdiği 
şeklindedir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I want to argue against the thesis asserting that separation of religion and state is a 
Western phenomenon, foreign to Islamic culture. To be sure, the thesis is addressed by both 
Western and Islamic scholars, e.g. Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, Tariq Ramadan, 
Nader Hashemi, among others.
1
 So, my concern is not postcolonial but historical and 
conceptual. My concern arises from the imprecise meaning of the separation due to the 
multiple models of separation in the West. Furthermore, some non-Western societies, e.g. 
Islamic or Indian societies, have adopted their own separation ideas to solve their own 
political problems apart from the Western separation models.
2
 In this paper, I present a 
Turkish case for separation, a case made by Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), who said, “The 
separation between religion and state is a goal sought by all civilized nations,”3 and, 
weighing several church-state relations, argued that Protestant approaches are better than 
French secularism
4
 because Protestants adopted Islamic social principles.
5
 My research 
                                       
1
 Lewis and Huntington’s thesis is well-known, but the other two from Muslim backgrounds may need 
additional note. Tariq Ramadan in his interview with Al Jazeera said, “we should never ever distinguish or 
separate, or divorce, politics from ethics. And ethics has to do with religion.” Ramadan’s comment needs to be 
read together with his another comment that Israel is not a secular state. Nader Hashemi also notes, “the Muslim 
experience has been marked by a perception of secularism as an alien ideology imposed from outside first by 
colonial and imperial invaders and then kept alive by local elites who came to power during the post-colonial 
period." Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, First Edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 
1991), 2–3; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996), 70; Tariq Ramadan, Al Jazeera English Head to Head: Has political Islam failed?, 
April 3, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com; Nader Hashemi, “The Multiple Histories of Secularism Muslim 
Societies in Comparison,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 36, no. 3–4 (March 1, 2010): 334. 
2
 Ira M. Lapidus, “The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, no. 4 (October 1, 1975): 363–85; Rajeev Bharghava, “The 
Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism,” in Indian Political Thought: A Reader, ed. Aakash Singh and Silika 
Mohapatra, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2010). 
3
 Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp, ed. and trans. 
Niyazi Berkes, Reprint (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), 102. 
4
 Gokalp said that French laicism became “the source of the sickness” for France. Ibid., 220. 
5
 Ibid., 214–23. 
 2 
question is to evaluate this claim of Gökalp, which may help us to reject the thesis. For this 
evaluation, I reexamine Gökalp’s own separation idea, and compare it with American and 
French separation models, and by so doing, want to contribute for the ongoing debates on 
separation to be less assertive in cross-cultural conversation. 
My first conclusion is that Gökalp’s separation idea shows the distinctive 
philosophical reflection to affirm separation from within his religion, and therefore it is closer 
to American separation model, which allows religious citizens to translate their religious 
views into the public language accessible to all parties—either religious or secular—in public 
sphere. From the first conclusion, a corollary follows: the claim concerning the absence of 
separation outside the West needs to be questioned insofar as Gökalp’s Islamic separation is 
similar with the American separation model. Second, Gökalp’s own comparative claim about 
the Western church-state relations, if it is read with other comparative arguments concerning 
separation, shows that separation has the multiple fronts of conceptual contestation. 
The paper proceeds as follow. I first review literature on American and French 
separation models to develop a comparative framework for Gökalp’s thought. I also review 
some secondary literature on Gökalp’s view on religion. Then, I read Gökalp’s texts to 
present his separation idea. I depend on the two English translations of his writings, Turkish 
Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp and The Principles of 
Turkism. After the textual survey, I compare his idea with American and French separation 
models, and develop my thesis and corollaries. In conclusion, I briefly discuss Gökalp’s 
separation in the development of Turkish secularism. In terms of methodology, the paper is 
largely descriptive, often with reflective commentaries on texts. This descriptive method may 
not satisfy those who expect a thematically coherent research dealing with Turkish politics. 
However, this paper centers on Gökalp, so it needs to be faithful to describe his texts 
themselves. Particularly, the paper avoids secularism or secularization debates in foreground. 
The reason to avoid secularism debates is because Gökalp himself openly rejects French 
laicism, although he supports separation. In other words, how to distinguish between 
secularism and separation beyond lingiuistic difference is a part of the dependent variable of 
this paper. In the end, Gökalp’s argument may sound similar with the recent phase of 
secularism debates, which is often termed as the post-secular.
6
 In these recent debates, 
                                       
6
 Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular Society,” New Perspectives Quarterly 25, no. 4 (September 1, 
2008): 17–29. 
 3 
secularization as a scientific prediction is empirically challenged,
7
 and secularism as an idea 
is critically distinguished between a mere statecraft principle and a comprehensive political 
ideology.
8
 However, reading Gökalp with the morphology of the post-secular debates can be 
anachronistic to neutralize all the textual flavors of Gökalp because he antedates the post-
secular society. Conversely, a faithful description of Gökalp’s texts would produce a concrete 
historical and conceptual case to be reusable for both Gökalp studies and secularism debates. 
In addition, I use the concept of separation flexibly to include legal, cultural, 
political or philosophical aspects. I do this because Gökalp as well as other literature 
addressed in this paper use the concept thus flexibly. Finally, since the phrase ‘separation of 
religion and state’ is too long and repetitive, I often use the word ‘separation’ without 
definitive article to mean the full phrase. 
  
                                       
7
 Philip S. Gorski and Ateş Altınordu, “After Secularization?,” Annual Review of Sociology 34, no. 1 (2008): 
55–85. 
8
 For a succinct argument, see José Casanova, “The Secular and Secularisms,” Social Research 76, no. 4 
(December 1, 2009): 1049–66; For an in-depth, comprehensive reivew, see Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, 1st 
ed. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Separation has multiple shapes across the world. India, for example, has necessitated 
the secular state to intervene the communal conflicts among numerous religious communities, 
often without religious institutions as church.
9
 In the West, American and French separation 
models are often compared to show the diversity of separation models. Officially, both 
American and French models maintain a legal separation: the Law of Separation between 
Church and State in France and the First Amendment in America. But they also differ. Every 
US President begins the office after receiving inaugural prayers from famous Christian 
pastors. This bond between political and religious leaders, though merely symbolic, is rare in 
France. Nevertheless, according to Jonathan Fox, US is seen as ‘the only’ country that 
separates religion and state, if the concept is measured mainly by government expenditures 
on religious institutions.
10
 Although France forbids even merely symbolic bonds between 
religion and state, she has been supporting many religious institutions by tax, so that Fox’s 
data model depreciates French separation. However, if one presses on to analyze government 
expenditures to measure separation, US is also culpable of supporting many faith-based 
organizations by public funds.
11
 Moreover, the government budget allocation is too narrow 
to capture other issues. In US, although the direct government support for church is illegal, 
the tax-exemption of church-related incomes and properties, which can grow as a big 
business, often creates disputes. In cultural dimension, while US debates on whether or not to 
                                       
9
 Bharghava, “The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism.” 
10
 Jonathan Fox, “World Separation of Religion and State Into the 21st Century,” Comparative Political Studies 
39, no. 5 (June 1, 2006): 537–69. 
11
 Details of such funding can be seen in ‘US Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnership’ website: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp/resources 
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drop the display of Ten Commandments in some public buildings,
12
 France keeps adding on 
the prohibitive religious symbols in public space, recently adding Muslim veils. 
Dennis Mueller, responding to these data (except those on headscarf ban), 
skpetically concludes that separation is nowhere complete, and exhorts all states to pursue “a 
complete separation.”13 But what is the complete separation when each state understands 
separation in their own way and disagree with each other? Perhapes the different attitudes 
toward France’s ban on Muslim headscarf (2011) show a distance between American and 
French separation models. A global poll shows that 82% French respondents approve of the 
ban, while 65% Americans disapprove of it, and only 28% American respondents approve of 
it.
14
 Likewise, US Office of International Religious Freedom often comments that the 
headscarf ban can violate religious freedom, while ECHR upholds that the French ban does 
not violate religious freedom,
15
 agreeing with many public polls in France.
16
 In front of 
Muslim headscarves in public space, French people and Americans not just differ but 
disapprove each other—headscarf ban is secularism in France, but headscarf freedom is 
separation in US. Given these multilayerd disagreements between the two separation models, 
a complete separation seems difficult to be pinpointed, and the comparison needs historical 
and conceptual analysis, rather than leveraging solely from state finance.  
I focus on three scholars for this historical and conceptual comparison between 
American and French separation models: Alexis de Tocqueville, Cecil Laborde, and Ahmet 
Kuru. They represent different time and space to enrich this comparison. With Tocqueville, I 
also cover a brief history of the two separation models. This historiography may seem 
lengthy for a theory paper, but acquainting some historical data is important for our 
discussion. Laborde and Kuru exemplify how to use these historical data to theorize the 
differences of the two. Using their contributions as well as other data, I will gradually 
develop my own comparative framework to locate Gökalp’s separation idea. 
                                       
12
 Jay A. Sekulow and Francis J. Manion, “Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments: Compounding the 
Establishment Clause Confusion,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 14 (2006 2005): 33. 
13
 Dennis C. Mueller, “The State and Religion,” Review of Social Economy 71, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 1–19. 
14
 “Widespread Support for Banning Full Islamic Veil in Western Europe” (Pew Research Center, July 8, 2010), 
http://pewresearch.org/. 
15
 ECHR Case of S.A.S. vs. France (Application no. 43835/11 No), 1 July 2014; for the full text of the decision 
case, see http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145466; for a press release brief, see Press 
Release ECHR 191 (2014) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/003-4809142-5861661    
16
 For a collection polls, see the link in Penelope Starr, “Understanding the EU Human Rights Court’s Big 
Ruling on France’s Headscarf Ban,” UN Dispatch, accessed March 2, 2015, http://www.undispatch.com/living-
together-trumps-freedom-religion-expression-echr-ruling/. 
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2.1. A Short History of American and French Models 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville is likely to be the earliest among those who compared 
American and French politics concerning religion’s role in public sphere. For Tocqueville, 
who just experienced French Revolution, in which the French Catholic Church was 
considered a foe, it was a surprise to see that American democracy thrives with religions. 
Tocqueville says, “I do not know if all Americans have faith in their religion—for who can 
read to the bottom of hearts?—but I am sure that they believe it necessary to the maintenance 
of republican institutions.”17 Tocqueville’s another surprise on the American ‘art of 
association’, i.e. the prolific, vibrant civil society organizations in America, also includes 
religious associations.
18
 Instead of emancipating individuals from old authorities like religion, 
Americans are making their democracy alongside with religions. Also, these Americans, 
either clergy or laity, “all attributed the peaceful dominion of religion in their country mainly 
to the separation of church and state.”19 Thus, according to Tocqueville, separation was 
welcomed or, rather, demanded by religious communities in the early America, where diverse 
immigrant communities from various religious backgrounds had to live together. 
But how does separation relate with the First Amendment when Tocqueville visited 
America? To be sure, before Tocqueville’s birth (1805), the First Amendment (1791) already 
had codified to “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.” Notice that there isn’t any word like ‘separation’ or any ban of religious 
communities to involve politics in this minimalistic legal code. Nevertheless, the First 
Amendment has been often debated through Jefferson’s presidential letter, which contains the 
phrase, ‘the wall of separation between church and state’.20 For example, US Supreme Court 
at least twice quoted Jefferson’s letter as an authoritative context to understand the First 
Amendment.
21
 However, these two court decisions connecting Jefferson’s wall and the First 
                                       
17
 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 280. emphasis added. 
18
 Democracy in America, ChV. Although in this chapter Tocqueville distinguishes political associations and 
non-political associations, he also shows how these non-political associations are leading public opinions and 
how American government is attentive to those opinions. 
19
 Democracy in America, Ch XVII. 
20
 The full text of the letter can be found in US Library of Congress website. See, Jefferson's Letter to the 
Danbury Baptists, URL http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html (accessed 2015.5.29) 
21
 E.g. By Chief Justice Morrison Waite, in Reynolds v. United States (1879), By Justice Hugo L. Black, in 
Everson v. Board of Education (1947) 
 7 
Amendment are divided in terms of supporting the secular position of each case: the Mormon 
argument for bigamy was rejected,
22
 but the students of private religious institutions were 
allowed to use the state-run, public school buses in New Jersey.
23
 In other words, the judicial 
debates with the metaphoric wall of separation have not necessarily affirmed the presumably 
secular position in any judicial issue involving the First Amendment, although the public 
debates on the secular-religious divide tend to use the word separation to imply a strong state 
decision against religious positions in various issues. The same point can be made by other 
judicial cases of the First Amendment. For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), the 
Supreme Court viewed that the Oregon Compulsory Education Act was violating the First 
Amendment by requiring all Oregon children to attend public school, limiting the religious 
conscience of some Oregon parents, who would send their children to private religious 
schools, e.g. Catholic institutions. Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown review a 
fuller judicial record on the First Amendment, and show that many decisions were supportive 
to the religious communities in each case.
24
 Although this data may frustrate some 
secularists, the First Amendment, for which the Jeffersonian wall offers an interpretive 
context, seems to show more continuity than discontinuity with Tocqueville: American 
separation model is religion-friendly. 
The concrete historical context of Jefferson’s letter itself further clarifies the 
religious root of American separation. Daniel L. Dreisbach offers a useful historical survey 
for this purpose. Apparently, the metaphoric phrase, ‘the wall of separation’, has been around 
in Anglophone political texts even before Jefferson’s time. Looking into a textual genealogy 
of the wall metaphor, Dreisbach highlights “Mennos Simons, Richard Hooker, James Burgh, 
and Thomas Jefferson described or proposed different walls of separation, each serving a 
function distinct from the others.”25 Simons wanted the wall to protect from state’s 
persecution an incipient Anabaptist community, which later becomes the Mennonites. Hooker 
polemically used the wall metaphor to reject Puritan separatists. James Burgh, a liberal 
Presbyterian, sounds the most radical, suggesting to “build an impenetrable wall of separation 
between things sacred and civil.” It is difficult to conclude whether and how much these early 
                                       
22
 Reynolds v. United States (1879) 
23
 Everson v. Board of Education (1947) 
24
 Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2014), 80–88. 
25
 Daniel Dreisbach, “The Meaning of the Separation of Church and State: Competing Views,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Church and State in the United States, ed. Derek H. Davis (Oxford University Press, 2010), 215. 
 8 
separatists or anti-separatist (i.e. Hooker) rhetoric affected Jefferson, but it’s noteworthy that 
they represent various religious communities in the founding era of America—different 
groups were gradually approaching toward the wall of separation for different reasons. 
Most importantly, the recipient of Jefferson’s letter was a Baptist association. He 
wrote the letter to thank the Danbury Baptists and Ceshire Baptist community, who had sent 
the Mammoth cheese to Jefferson few days before the letter was written. But thank for what? 
Dreisbach argues that there was an alliance between Jefferson and these Baptists for electoral 
and political reasons. In Dreisbach’s words, these two Baptist groups were: 
persecuted and marginalized religious and political minorities in New 
England states firmly controlled by a Congregationalist-Federalist 
establishment. Both Baptist communities celebrated Jefferson’s election as 
the harbinger of a new dawn of religious liberty. Jefferson, in return, 
expressed solidarity with the persecuted New England Baptists in their 
aspirations for political acceptance and religious liberty.
26
  
 
Dreisbach provides other historical data to support this interpretation. For example, 
Congregationalists were trying to nationalize the National Day of Thanksgiving and Fasting, 
but other religious communities, e.g. those recipients of Jefferson’s letter, despised such 
nationalizing ideas, and condemned Congregationalists of imitating English Anglican 
ecclesiology. Congregationalists, who had been separatists themselves vis-à-vis English 
Monarch and its Anglican Church, were now imitating the nationalizing ecclesiology of 
Anglican Church with the supports from Federalists. In a sense, Jefferson’s letter was to 
remind Americans of the separatist root of their ancestors. Also, two days after sending out 
the letter, Jefferson attended a worship service at the House of Representatives, and the 
preacher of that service was Elder John Leland from anti-Federalist camp, which couldn’t 
send their preachers to the House for a long time because Congregationalists in alliance with 
Federalists were dominating the worship service at the House.
27
 In short, many concrete 
historical contexts suggest that the Jeffersonian wall had more to do with religious pluralism, 
in which no particular religious sect dominates public sphere, rather than removing religion 
out of politics. 
To summarize, Jefferson’s letter and Tocqueville’s text suggest that the early 
American separation was not against religion per se, but allowed religion[s] to involve 
                                       
26
 Daniel Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and State (NYU Press, 
2002), (the penultimate page of Ch.2). 
27
 Ibid., (Ch.2). 
 9 
political culture, e.g. by associations, prayer services in government buildings, etc. And this 
religious political culture actively sought out pluralism to ensure the equal distribution of 
symbolic presence of each community, as Jefferson tried to make a balance between 
Federalist and anti-Federalists preachers at the podium in the House. Tocqueville and 
Jefferson thus offer the immediate textual connection between American separation model 
and the religiously pluralistic political culture, and yet two other historical contexts further 
specify the relation between religious pluralism and American separation. 
First, the American Revolution unfolded in a religious and pluralistic context. By the 
time of the Revolution, four strongest denominations spread across the thirteen colonies and 
many other sects were not insignificant in numbers.
28
 Furthermore, the thirteen colonies of 
the Revolution were loosely identified with a certain religious denomination in their historical 
origin. Massachusetts was initiated by Congregationalists/Puritans. Pennsylvania was the safe 
heaven for Quakers and other Anabaptist communities, e.g. Amish. Maryland was assigned 
for Catholics, to commemorate the Queen Mary of England, who protected English Catholics 
against Anglican Church in the isle, and so on. Under this religiously pluralistic demography, 
any formal recognition of a particular sect in Federal level was virtually impossible. So, when 
the Revolution brought together all these colonies, the Federal level neutrality toward 
different religions would have been presupposed as a necessity to harmonize all communities. 
Besides, many preachers from different denominations played an important role to mobilize 
people for the wars through their sermons. Maria Gehrke analyzes these pro-revolution 
sermons, and highlights the three common themes as “[t]he legitimacy of the colonial cause, 
oppressive politics of England and the need to preserve colonial rights and liberties.”29 
Gehrke also suggests that these sermons could have been more influential to mobilize people 
than war pamphlets because sermons are delivered to a focused and personal group.
30
 Then, 
competition among religious denominations for the war mobilization was imaginable, as 
Quakers, which had refused to fight due to their pacifism, continues apologizing,
31
 while 
other denominations commemorate their war participation in 4
th
 of July every year—as if 
                                       
28
 See Table 9.1. Churches in the Thirteen Colonies, 1740 and 1776, in Mark A Noll, America’s God: From 
Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 162. 
29
 Maria Gehrke, The Revolution of the People: Thoughts and Documents on the Revolutionary Process in 
North America 1774-1776 (Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2006), 100. 
30
 Ibid., 92. 
31
 William C. Kashatus, “Quakers’ Painful Choice during the American Revolution,” Philly.com, July 5, 2015, 
http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/20150705_Quakers__painful_choice_during_the_American_Revolution.h
tml. 
 10 
pluralism in competition for patriotism. Thus, the social context of the American Revolution 
was all but religious and pluralistic. This parallels with that these religious communities who 
migrated to the new land were separatists themselves in their former homelands. As religious 
separatists or dissenters escaping from all over the Europe contributed to the state-building, 
the religious freedom and religious pluralism in the light of separatist rhetoric is deeply 
embedded with a national birth mythology of America. 
Second, many religious intellectuals of the early America were rapidly adopting 
Scottish commonsense realism for their philosophical languages after the Revolution. The 
commonsense realism is a tenant of Scottish Enlightenment philosophies, most notably 
developed by Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid. Rejecting Hume’s skepticism and 
affirming the basic epistemological ability of every human being, commonsense realism 
views that every individual in their natural status has innate or intuitive moral capability. 
According to Mark Noll, commonsense realism was crucial for both those who want to 
preserve the significance of Christianity in public and those who want to spread 
Enlightenment ideas in the post-Revolution America.
32
 In fact, American Christians were 
unwilling to adopt this new philosophy due to their commitment to biblical arguments. But, 
after the Revolution, Christians began to see the value of commonsense reasoning. Noll says, 
“the most articulate spokesmen for the commonsense moral reasoning of the American 
Enlightenment were Protestant educators and ministers . . . [f]or Protestants who wanted to 
preserve traditional forms of Christianity without having to appeal to traditional religious 
authorities, commonsense reasoning…was the answer.”33 For the leading intellectuals of the 
new nation, the philosophy was also a medium to show that the new political system is 
compatible with the Christianity.
34
 Commonsense moral reasoning thus provided a 
philosophical proxy to realize separation in that different religious and secular philosophies 
can converse about state affairs without appealing to sectarian moral authorities. And the 
emphasis must fall on that it’s the religious people who led Americans to spread this 
particular Enlightenment philosophy in the new born nation. 
In contrast, the historical development of France’s 1905 Separation Law differs from 
American experience in many points. First off, unlike the prominence of religion in American 
separation, the French Revolution, the cradle of French secularism, conceived a mutual 
                                       
32
 Noll, America’s God, 93–113. 
33
 Ibid., 103. 
34
 Ibid., 112–3. 
 11 
hostility between secularists and Catholics. Scholars vary on the degree and order of this 
hostility, but there were remarkable incidents of aggression against Catholics—priests were 
sentenced to death, church properties were confiscated, religious symbols were destroyed or 
replaced by revolutionary images. Most of all, the goddess ‘Reason’ was celebrated in Notre 
Dame Cathedral, one of the most important Catholic churches in France.
35
 Alongside with 
the Cathedral, many other churches across France were converted into Temples of Reason. 
There was something more than anti-Catholicism. Historian Michael Burleigh notes that the 
French Revolution was the first anti-religious mass murder in history.
36
 The revolutionary 
ideals turned into something like a totalitarian religion to replace the older one.  
What were the causes of this anti-religious turn? It might have been partially 
influenced by some satirical texts of French Enlightenment thinkers, such as, Voltaire’s 
Candide. However, as Voltaire himself defended Jean Calas, a French Protestant persecuted 
by the Catholic Monarchy,
37
 the link between French Enlightenment thoughts and the 
antireligious sentiment of the Revolution seems inconclusive. It is clear, though, that 
Enlightenment thinkers were hostile to the powerful estates privileged by the institutional 
church, and, at the same time, Catholic Church considered Descartes or Voltaire as threat by 
adding their names in the list of prohibited books (the Index Librorum Prohibitorum).
38
 So, 
knowing their intellectual heroes are banned by the Catholic Church, the revolutionary 
citizens would have perceived the Catholic Church as the enemy of their cultural progress, 
regardless of Voltaire’s own nuances about the church and religion in general. 
Besides, the anti-religious campaigns were unlikely to be an original intention of the 
revolution leaders, because they also sought political cooperation from Catholic leaders.
39
 
The emergence of hostility was rather contingent to the power dynamics among church, king 
and revolutionaries. Counter-revolutionaries were largely from rural Catholics, who also 
killed many revolutionary forces in brutal manners. Either way, this mutual hostility may 
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have weakened its physical violence, but its intensity has not disappeared even after French 
Revolution. Although Napoleon’s Concordat agreement (1801) recognized four official 
religions by state as corporatism, the agreement was mostly seen as the re-establishment of 
Catholic Church, as Napoleon received his coronation from the Pope Pious VII at Notre 
Dame Cathedral. Later, in Paris Commune (1871), the Cathedral was burned again, and the 
bishop of Paris was shot by the charge of supporting royalists. Having exchanged their dead 
bodies, French Catholics and secularists can’t have the same reception of the Law of 
Separation (1905). Even though the French Law is similar with the First Amendment in their 
texts, the French code appears as the final blow to Catholics, and the final victory to 
republican elites. 
Second, unlike Anglophone contexts, French society didn’t have a meaningful 
degree of religious pluralism but maintained a homogeneous religiosity with the dominant 
Catholic Church. If one views Europe as one chunk, Reformation and the subsequent 
religious wars, e.g. 30 Years War, English Civil War, etc., appear as a historical step toward 
the pluralistic Europe. But if one isolates France from the rest of Europe, it has been 
constantly a Catholic society until today, resistant to domestic and foreign Protestants. 
Although John Calvin, a French theologian, contributed to create Presbyterians, Baptists, 
Congregationalists and many other Protestant movements across Europe, Calvin’s own 
French disciples, i.e. Huguenots, were persecuted by French Catholics, and had to flee to all 
over the world including Ottoman Empire, which was maintaining arguably the most tolerant 
social structure at that time. If Calvinism, which has a French root, was thus persecuted, 
Lutheranism, a German movement, seemed too foreign to French soil. In fact, Lutheran states 
were often enemy to France. If Calvinism and Lutheranism constitute Reformation, it 
thoroughly escaped France. Given the homogenous religiosity maintained by Catholicism, the 
political debates between secularists and Catholics turns into a duel, i.e. the clash between 
two majorities, rather than multiple, complex negotiations as in America, where different 
religious sects and different political parties keep changing alliance partners for electoral 
reasons. But in France, due to the homogeneous and dominant religiosity, the secular 
response against it proportionally unfolded with a homogenizing contour. As Leon Gambetta 
puts, “we only have one religion, namely, intellectual culture for all the French.”40 
Third, in the context of the French Revolution, the privatization of religion was not 
just a philosophical proposal to strengthen private sphere but also a legal enforcement upon 
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Catholic priests. During the process of confiscating churches, the revolutionary authority, i.e. 
the Convention, offered two options for the priests: either to take the oath of submission or to 
leave their church to officiate worship in private houses.
41
 The memory of forced 
privatization distorts the debates on the proper position of religion in public sphere because 
the privatization can be seen as a defeat from the vantage point of the forcibly privatized. 
This move contrasts with that American religious communities were initially enjoying their 
private freedom of worship, and then came out to public sphere to contribute for their 
Revolution against British Monarch. In France, the dominant church was enjoying the royal, 
public privilege, and then forced into private sphere by the Revolution. Moreover, Catholic 
theology does not show genuine affinity with private religiosity. Catholicism honors 
collective human experience, and often polemically engages with the religious individualism 
of Protestantism, which depends on the individual interpretation of the Bible as the core 
foundation of their religion.
42
 Although this individualistic religiosity of Protestantism 
doesn’t exclude the possibility of the collective actions—as in America—it can provide a 
genuine theological foundation to support the privatization of religion as far as it is 
compatible with their confessional core. In contrast, French Catholics have experienced 
neither a theological support nor an acceptable political process concerning privatization, but, 
instead, had to bear with the memory of the forced privatization during the French Revolution. 
Even in the best scenario, the privatization of religion may need complex theological 
translation to persuade Catholics, but the particular historical context of France made that 
translation more challenging. 
The comparative historiography to show some broader contexts of the two 
separation models is summarized in Table 1. 
 
 American Separation French Secularism 
Philosophical 
Context 
Commonsense realism 
(accepted by most religious parties) 
French Enlightenment thinkers vs. 
Catholic censorship 
Social 
Context 
Religiously pluralistic Religiously homogeneous 
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Revolution 
Context 
Religious communities were 
revolutionary. 
Many Catholics were counter-
revolutionary. 
Table 1. The Historical Contexts of American and French Separation Models. 
 
If one juxtaposes the legal codes of the First Amendment and French Law of Separation, 
there is not much difference can be found on the texts. However, the actual legislations and 
public policies concerning religion very differ in two countries, as I have gathered at the 
beginning of this chapter: headscarf ban is secularism in France, but headscarf freedom is 
separation in America. France actively seeks out to remove any religious symbol in public 
sphere, while America seeks out different pastors from different sects to lead the presidential 
inauguration prayers. Table 1 can hint about from where these empirical differences originate. 
In short, American separation model unites but distinguishes between religion and politics in 
a civil and cordial relationship, while French secularism signifies the fight between two 
realms. Many scholars have penned these empirical differences between two separation 
models with different analytical purposes.
43
 Notice the strong continuity that prominent 
scholars have been writing the same observation for the last three centuries: Alexis de 
Tocqueville wrote it in the 19
th
 century, Robert Bellah distinguished the civil religion of 
America from the militant secularism of France in the middle of 20
th
 century,
44
 and two other 
influential works, which I am going to review in the next section, compared the same models 
in the 21
st
 century. 
 
2.2. Comparative Frameworks 
 
Among contemporary scholars on this comparison, Cécile Laborde has been 
focusing on the theoretic difference between Anglo-American and French separation 
models.
45
 Engaging the French headscarf affair, Laborde begins with a contrast that Anglo-
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American theorists tend to neglect the French debates, while French secularists tend to see 
the non-secular public culture of US “falling short” of secular standards.46 To explain the 
difference, Laborde unpacks three concepts underpinning French secularism, i.e. state 
neutrality, autonomy and community, and compares them with Anglo-American liberal 
separation. Narrowly defined, neutrality and autonomy may correspond to liberal ideas of 
institutional separation and individuals’ commitment to democratic citizenship. However, the 
third concept, the notion of community, which demands a kind of “loyalty to a particular 
historical community”, is “the least amenable to liberal thought”47 because it forces a 
particular system of idea to all citizens, as if it is “a new civil religion.”48 Often combined 
with the strong state tradition of France, this communitarian aspect of secularism actually 
breaks the conceptual coherency of individual autonomy: it’s no longer individual choice but 
a “forcible liberalization.”49  
Empirically speaking, Laborde points out that the three concepts of French 
secularism are unfit for Muslims in France, although the advocates of Muslim headscarf are 
ironically appealing to the secular ideals articulated in the three concepts. For example, state 
neutrality, which originally aims to ensure religious freedom by state’s abstention from 
religious affairs, actually turned into “active neutrality” to support religious institutions, 
which otherwise would not be self-sustained. However, due to the predominance of Catholic 
religion in France, according to Laborde, this active neutrality turns into “active partiality”, in 
which Muslim communities are relatively less appreciated than Catholics.
50
 Given this 
unevenness, the wearing headscarf in public sphere is even lesser than demanding a full-
blown equality in the active neutrality to protect religious freedom. Likewise, the headscarf is 
both a way of individual choice and a way to join the pluralistic French community.
51
 The 
secular arguments by the headscarf advocates sound like American liberal separation, while 
the French secularism understood by the most French citizens still resists their arguments.  
Having shown the empirical and conceptual tension between American and French 
separation models, Laborde does not evaluate which one is better, but provides some useful 
notes on how to compare them. First, French secularism is broader or more comprehensive 
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than American liberal separation. If American separation is a “political liberal”, French one is 
a “comprehensive liberal.”52 In her own words, “it would be a mistake to reduce laïcité to a 
conception of the proper relationship between state and religion…laïcité is a broader moral 
and social philosophy, a complex set of ideals and commitments…”53 Second, French 
secularism has not developed as an abstract political theory, but remained as a practical 
slogan for a concrete historical conflict, i.e. liberating modern France from the dominant 
Catholic church. Historically rooted, time-sensitive idea, French secularism had made sense 
when the Law of Separation was enacted in 1905, but entered a new era with Muslim 
communities. The new debate is necessary, but as it always has been, French secularism does 
not operate with analytical language, although Anglophone liberalism and French Muslims 
prefer such language. In contrast, French advocates of the ban keep using the language with 
“a self-referential, rhetorical and particularistic style,” according to Laborde.54 She concludes 
that Anglophone analytic languages would weaken the conceptual coherency of French 
secularism,
55
 even though it would be “explicitly accepted by all French participants as 
useful, relevant and reasonably coherent concept.”56 Figuratively speaking, where American 
and French separation models are compatible to each other, the French headscarf affair would 
be less problematic, but where French model is bigger than American separation, the ban 
becomes intelligible to French secularists but inexplicable to Anglophone liberals. 
Ahmet Kuru, a Turkish scholar, also elaborates the qualitative difference between 
American and French separation models.
57
 Kuru theorizes from the assumption that the 
historical conditions during state-building process can influence the course of the 
development of secularism in each state. The key historical difference between the two is 
whether to have a strong state married with a hegemonic religion in state-building periods. As 
France had to deal with such hegemonic power, the country developed “assertive secularism”, 
in which secular principles must be fought against the all-embracing Catholic power. In 
contrast, American history didn’t have such hegemonic power, according to Kuru, but 
multiple religious and secular communities sought an overlapping consensus. Henceforth, 
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American case is described as “passive secularism”, in which secularists don’t necessarily 
oppose religion per se as long as it follows the rule of overlapping consensus as public reason.  
Between assertive and passive secularism, Kuru evaluates that Turkish secularism 
followed the assertive secularism confronting the heritage of Ottoman Empire and the Sunni 
majority. I am not making any comment about his conclusion. But, I generally agree with his 
comparative framework applied to American and French models, and, in comparison with 
Kuru’s view on Turkish secularism, I argue that Gökalp’s separation idea—if I use Kuru’s 
term—can be called as passive secularism. A forgotten alternative, a minority report attached 
to the majority position of Kemalism, Gökalp’s separation model may help to understand the 
diverse spectrum of Turkish secularism. 
 
2.3. Gökalp in Turkish Studies 
 
Before delving into Gökalp’s texts, it is in order to review some works of Gökalp. 
Gökalp appears regularly in various research topics, and his views on religion have been 
constantly popular. This popularity is due to that Gökalp is famous for his synthesis of Islam, 
modernity and nationalism, and his view of religion is often discussed as a part of this 
threefold synthesis. As early as possible, Niyazi Berkes had located Gökalp’s Pan-Turansim 
in tension with both “Pan-Islamism and rugged Westernism.”58 In the twenty first century, 
Andrew Davison called the same synthesis “trinity”, and Ayşe Kadioğlu “the logic of 
empire”.59 The synthesis literature distinguishes two kinds of Islam, i.e. either compatible 
or incompatible with modern Turkey, and views that Gökalp’s Islam is compatible with 
modern Turkey. 
But how significant is religion in Gökalp’s synthesis? Scholars vary on this question. 
In Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutical Reconsideration,
60
 Davison 
reviews the secondary literature on Gökalp, and highlights, “some see not much weight [of 
religion] relative to his nationalism (e.g. Heyd); others see too much relative to his 
nationalism (e.g. Dodd); and others, an overwhelming amount within this nationalism (e.g., 
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Arai).”61 Davison explains that scholars vary about the significance of religion in Gökalp 
because they render Gökalp against researchers’ preconception of Turkish secularism. 
Instead, Davison suggests that Gökalp was trying to secure both religious heritage and 
modernity by endorsing separation of religion and state. This last sentence, alongside with 
all the comparative reviews of American and French separation models in this section, 
makes a good segue way to Gökalp’s texts. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TEXTS: GÖKALP’S SEPARATION IDEA 
 
 
On the one hand, Gökalp endorses separation. On the other, Gökalp envisions that 
state should be united with national culture, which is an Islamic culture in the case of Gökalp. 
If a particular religious culture is to be united with state legislation, does separation still hold? 
One can view that two opposing tendencies are fighting in Gökalp. I instead argue that 
Gökalp is fulfilling the duty of civic translation, i.e. presenting one’s religious ideals by a 
language accessible to all in public sphere. I begin with his separation argument, and move 
on to another textual strand, which sounds dissonant to his separation argument. After 
reviewing both textual strands, I try to reconcile them in the last part of this section. 
 
3.1. Separation 
 
To begin with, Gökalp asserts, “The separation between religion and state is a goal 
sought by all civilized nations.”62 Gökalp offers at least four lines of argument to support this 
statement: i) Islam precedes the emergence of state legal system; ii) Sufi-idealism shows that 
legality is not the essential part of religion; iii) nations evolve from theocracy to culture 
nation; and, finally, iv) the culture-civilization dichotomy changes religion-based 
internationality into science-based one. The first two can be called Gökalp’s religious 
argument for separation, and the other two his secular argument for separation. I categorize 
his pro-separation arguments by religious and secular tags because they describe well the 
contents of each argument, and, more importantly, this division itself shows a proper attitude 
of those who maintain both religious and secular identities in oneself. If separation is to be 
acceptable to all citizens including the religious, separation must be genuinely argued from 
the religious core of the religious citizens. More precisely, separation must be better and 
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truer for religion. Otherwise, separation remains as an unwanted or unsolicited concession 
from the perspective of the religious. Fortunately, Gökalp has both religious and secular 
arguments to support separation, as if he maintains two distinctive personas agreeing each 
other in one self. 
Approaching the question of religion-state relation as a religious person, Gökalp’s 
main concern is to ask what is good for his religion, an independent question from what is 
good for his state. He begins by recalling that the Islam has non-state root, and argues that the 
non-state root of Islam can positively harmonize separation and Islam in two ways. First, 
Gökalp distinguishes two eras of Islam by Hijra, i.e. Prophet Muhammad’s journey from 
Mecca to Medina. And he points out, “the religion that the state recognizes officially 
today…is nothing but fiqh [i.e. Islamic jurisprudence] But the fiqh did not exist until one and 
a half centuries after the Hijra.”63 Call this the argument ‘older is better’. As many European 
reformers, e.g. Martin Luther or John Calvin, challenged the Papal system by appealing to the 
ancient church fathers, e.g. St. Augustine, etc., religious people often claim that the older 
form of their religion is not just more aged but more pristine, while the contemporary religion 
has been compromised by institutional problems to the extent of necessitating a reform, a 
radical return to the root. A reformer Gökalp similarly reminds his readers of that the 
religious core of Islam precedes the institutional peripheries of Islam and the emergence of 
modern state. This reminder sets a genuine religious ground for separation because Muslims 
can be assured about that separation doesn’t harm their religion, but rather purify it: pre-hijra 
Islam and the separation principle of modernity together can help the contemporary Islam to 
be more pristine. 
Similarly, Gökalp makes a ‘smaller is better’ argument. He compares Ottoman 
Empire and other Islamic communities in different times and spaces, and argues that the other 
communities show “the power of the religion of Islam”,64 but the Islam of Ottoman Empire 
is relatively weak because “the attachment of religion to the state in our country [i.e. Ottoman 
Empire] has not been to its advantage, but rather to the extreme detriment of religion.”65 
While Gökalp thus argues that integration weakens the religiosity of Islam, he goes on to say, 
“religion has begun to fulfill its function more effectively as it has demarcated its private 
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sphere.”66 The private sphere of religion, Gökalp argues, is the source of strengthening 
religion. To supplement this view, Gökalp provides some examples of the powerful Muslim 
communities living in Russia, China, India, or Egypt.
67
 Unfortunately, Gökalp does not go in 
detail to connect these communities with his emphasis on the private religion. However, the 
link is deducible from what he said. Notice that these communities are either a minority (as 
Muslims in Russia, India or China) or a majority but with a substantial competition with 
another religious community (as in Egypt, having Muslim & Coptic). Being a minority or a 
majority with competition, their default position on religion-state relation must be separation 
regardless of their preference because they can’t integrate state and religion due to the 
strength of other communities in public sphere. Therefore, their religiosity tends to focus 
more on private sphere than public sphere. In contrast, the Sunni Muslims in Ottoman Empire 
enjoy the dominant position protected by the imperial power. In such imperial setting, the 
relative emphasis would fall on the public, external manifestation of Islam, rather than on 
private reflection. Ironically, Gökalp finds that the power of Islam is stronger with the 
Muslim communities in a weaker position, which can’t unite religion and state. The imperial 
Islam looks powerful in public, but, in fact, Gökalp concludes, “Islam has not been a power 
in our country simply because it could not perform its private function independently within 
the framework of the state.”68 
The religiosity that finds its source from private sphere provides a genuine religious 
ground to support separation. The external influence of Islam may seem decreasing by 
separation, but the inward-looking change does not necessarily mean the decline of Islam per 
se. Separation can actually strengthen the power of Islam by sorting out the religious core 
shared by all the minority Muslim communities, i.e. private religion. To be sure, it is unclear 
what is strong or weak concerning the power of religion. This is a theological question, which 
is less relevant for the purpose of this section. Likewise, historians would vary on whether 
and how much the Ottoman Empire integrated Islam and politics. Rather, the goal of this 
section is to highlight Gökalp’s separation idea as understood by himself. For this purpose, it 
is fair to summarize that Gökalp supports separation because he thinks that the source of 
Islam is older and more essential than modern state and its institutional interfaces with Islam. 
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Separation also benefits Islam because it strengthens the power of religion by foregrounding 
the private aspect of religion. 
In a similar but more abstract manner, Gökalp develops a religious philosophy of 
anti-legalism. For Gökalp, religion seeks to transcend the limits of laws, while state promotes 
all kinds of laws. As far as state and religion are getting tightly integrated, religion moves 
away from its core function of transcending the boundary of legal fixity. Gökalp makes the 
same argument with various textual strands: anti-legalism, anti-formalism and Sufi-idealism. 
All three strands are pro-separation.  
Anti-legalism as a religious call pervades in his texts. To begin with, Gökalp says, 
“[t]he state is a legal machinery; it tends to legalize and formalize any social force upon 
which it touches. It is because of this fact that Islam started to lose its vitality from the 
moment it began to be fused with the political organization…”69 Reflecting upon his text, 
notice an asymmetrical effect: state aims for legality, while religion for vitality. If both 
qualities are required to maintain a healthy society, the two ought not be mixed, because as 
soon as (“from the moment”) they are mixed, only religion loses its quality, although the state 
doesn’t lose anything but instead strengthens itself. In other words, integration follows the 
logic of state, which mechanizes all things including religion, but separation follows the logic 
of religion, which vitalizes all things including state. Thus the outcome of integration is the 
death of religion, while the outcome of separation is the revival of both. Given this 
asymmetry, religion must proactively pursue the attitude of anti-legalism. 
Elsewhere Gökalp criticizes formalism, a synonym of legalism.
70
 He argues that 
both conservatism and radicalism are the outgrown symptom of formalism, which reduces 
everything into a rule-based system. Conservatism is a formalism that sticks to old rules, 
while radicalism is another formalism that sticks to a new set of rules. Of course, Gökalp 
views that any formalism, either conservatism or radicalism, is powerless to bring any 
efficacious social change because the formal rules are merely the product (but not the source) 
of social change. Hoping to escape the swindling between the two types of formalism, 
Gökalp redirects our attention from outward rules to deeper sources of social change, and 
suggests that religion is one of such sources. Religion therefore should inspire the society to 
bring a deeper change than the superficial rule-makings. Integration between religion and 
state can be understood as a typical error of formalism because it certainly focuses on legal 
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enforcement both from and to religion. More importantly, integration is not just erroneous 
formalism but depreciates the high calling of religion to be a source of social change. 
Sufism as understood by Gökalp also shows that separation is truer to his religion 
than integration. To be sure, his discussion on Sufism does not deal with particular Islamic 
sects but with a metaphysical philosophy in which religion is conceptually intertwined. In 
particular, Gökalp says, “It is erroneous to equate sufism with that school of thought called 
mysticism in Western philosophy. Sufism corresponds, in its general meaning, to idealism.”71 
Gökalp argues that sufi-idealism is more advanced than Western idealism because it precedes 
and perfects the Western counterpart. Either way, in our separation debates, Gökalp’s sufi-
idealism must be distinguished from actual sufi orders, who can be either mystics or 
fighters.
72
 
In short, Gökalp’s sufi-idealism argues that, although science is conquering almost 
all spheres of human life, it still cannot penetrate certain areas, such as, consciousness, ideals, 
values, ethics, aesthetics, and so on. Sufi-idealism works in these areas, and provides 
tentative answers to create a future, for which science cannot imagine due to its own logic. 
This future creating force of sufi-ideals vis-à-vis scientific optimization is, according to 
Gökalp, analogous to the research methods of sufic theologians and Kantian idealists in that 
they accept the inaccessibility of God or ideas, but still work out to draw meaningful 
conclusions from the unknowable divine essence or transcendental ideals in order to give 
impact to phenomenal world, where science is already exhausted.
73
 
Although Gökalp does not himself explicitly connect his understanding of Sufism 
with separation, we can see the relation between two. State or anything that is going to be 
integrated into state’s legal machinery belongs to the domain of the known (i.e. science), the 
past or the present. If any idea was unknown to us here and now, it cannot be written into 
legal codes. Conversely, Religion or anything for which religion struggles comes from the 
domain of the unknown or the future or the transcendent. If any idea is already fully known to 
us, state can actually lock it by a law to avoid any error or inefficiency. However, both 
Gökalp’s sufi-idealism and our common sense suggest that there is always an unexplored 
area of knowledge. So, religion as a pursuit of unknown ideals has a place to work alongside 
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with state as a science. This dichotomy does not make religion unscientific or unrealistic, but, 
rather, acknowledges that state as a scientific project alone cannot solve every human 
problem, and there are always new questions emerging from the past political arrangements 
embedded in state, the questions that science cannot immediately answer but somebody 
should try to solve. In this view, the separation between religion and state must be a constant 
attitude of any self-claimed religious person, lest all things will be reduced into state system, 
and religion will lose its significance in the society. Fortunately to the religious, Gökalp’s 
sufi-idealism suggests that there is a place for religion, i.e. future creating ideals, rather than 
integrating civic laws with religious traditions. 
Gökalp’s religious persona is not only sufic but also dealing with concrete 
institutional issues as an advocate of separation. Speaking of the necessity of establishing 
Ministry of Pious Affairs, Gökalp argues that piety and jurisprudence are two different 
functions. Piety deals with the sacred aspect of life, which transcends ‘earthly considerations’, 
but jurisprudence must be subjected to positivistic science.
74
 Mixing these two functions in 
one individual is harmful for his religion, because religious teachers cannot receive the proper 
training to serve their core values of piety, especially so in an advanced society in which 
division of labor has already applied to religion.
75
 Fully convinced of the necessity of the 
separation, Gökalp even prays to God for this separation, calling it a blessing.
76
 Similarly, 
Gökalp separates Caliphate and Sultanate, and argues that the two supreme titles do not 
compete for power as in Roman Catholic countries, but works for different spheres: one for 
piety, and the other for law. Given this proper distinction, any attempt to maintain a dual 
legal system—one by Caliphate/religion, the other by Sultanate/state—is viewed as a vice. 
The Caliphate-initiated law must be abolished, and the entire legal function must be 
exclusively owned by the proper legal institution, i.e. state. Again, separation produces not 
only a better legal service but also a better piety.
77
 These two institutional arguments are 
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interesting in that they are often referred to show the absence of separation of religion and 
state because they are officially established by state. However, Gökalp views that these 
religious institutions are the products of separation. 
So far I have discussed how Gökalp as a religious reformer genuinely argues for 
separation. He believes that it is empirically better and conceptually truer to his religion, 
which has a non-state root, and promotes anti-legalism and future creating ideals from within 
his religious philosophy. And by so doing, Gökalp exemplifies how a religious person can 
search out the possibility of both maintaining the significance of religion and upholding the 
separation principle according to one’s own religious philosophy. Alongside with these 
religious arguments, Gökalp also develops secular arguments for separation. In these secular 
arguments, Gökalp does not apologetically argue for the cause of his religion, but 
scientifically shows that human society in general has been evolving to separate religion and 
state, making integration an old phenomenon, a less evolved stage than separation. 
For example, Gökalp shows the progress of human society by a simple two stages 
model: primitive and organic.
78
 In the primitive society, there is only one kind of mores—a 
term that Gökalp heavily uses to describe social consciousness—and that is religious mores. 
In the organic society, however, political and cultural mores are differentiated from the 
religious mores, and each of them oversees the corresponding institutions in the society: the 
religious mores oversees religious institutions, and the political mores does political 
institutions, and so on.
79
 In this distinction, Gökalp is concerned with the intervention of the 
religious mores over non-religious institutions, saying, “[the power of religious mores] 
becomes harmful when it is extended to worldly or secular, and especially to material, 
institutions because it prevents these institutions from adapting themselves to the 
expediencies of life. Therefore, the predominance of religious mores over all institutions is 
not something to be desired for organic society.”80 In short, the old ways of life in a new 
kind of society is inconvenient to the point of being dangerous like new wine in old 
wineskins. 
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Similarly, Gökalp defines the four subtypes of nation: theocratic nation, legislative 
nation, culture-nation, and nation without independence.
81
 Treating the fourth type as an 
outlier, the former three make an evolution process: theocratic nation, the oldest type, evolves 
to legislative nation, and legislative nation to culture-nation. The differentiation of authority 
is one of the defining features in this process. Religious and political authorities are unified in 
theocratic nation but differentiated in legislative nation. Culture-nation further differentiates 
several cultural authorities from both religious and political heads. Interestingly, Gökalp 
views that no nation actually has reached the last stage of culture-nation in his time.
82
 It is 
because Gökalp’s culture-nation, the final evolutionary stage of nations, leaves its end open 
with transcendent ideals.
83
 Although the future may be open, the past is not. Concerning 
religion-state relation, Gökalp clearly views that integration is older than separation in human 
history. Theocratic Medieval era has gone away. 
Gökalp’s culture-civilization dichotomy expands the historical movement embedded 
in his nation-types theory to international level. To give a simple account for this dichotomy, 
culture is a totality of domestic phenomena, while civilization is a rationality that penetrates 
several cultures in international level. Although Gökalp intensely uses these two words with 
various contents, he is consistent to use them as a dynamic category to define the flexible 
distance between something national and something international.
84
 With this dichotomy, 
Gökalp views that the internationality based on religion is an old phenomenon, though not 
older than religious tribal communities, in which no internationality exist.
85
 Both Christianity 
and Islam had innovated human societies by showing an internationality, in which diverse 
linguistic and cultural groups joined together under the banner of each religion. Applying the 
four nation-types, theocratic nations were synchronizing with religious internationality in past. 
However, a new era has emerged. The new internationality is based on science,
86
 and the 
new nation types likewise are based on either the legislative or culture-nation, in which the 
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separation of religion and state was accomplished as a minimum requirement of the science 
applied to politics. So, separation in each nation becomes an interface for all the other nations 
from different religious and cultural backgrounds to create a common, homogenous 
internationality, which can be seen as an evolved stage from the two-fold, half 
internationality of the religious eras. 
To be sure, the new internationality based on science does not undermine the 
significance of religion in both international and national levels, but creates a proper sphere 
for religion in both levels. In national level, as I already have argued, Gökalp views that the 
scientific mechanization can never complete domestic political enterprise, and his religion 
can serve with future-creating ideals that science cannot conceive due to its own logic. 
Likewise, although the new internationality evolves from the religiously divided civilizations 
to the scientifically homogeneous world, this homogeneity in international level never means 
cosmopolitanism, as Gökalp makes it clear, “Turkism…is against cosmopolitanism.”87 One 
way to join the homogeneous internationality without accepting cosmopolitanism is to 
differentiate national cultures. This harmonizes with his nation-types theory, in which nations 
evolve toward culture nation. So, his nation theory and international theories move toward in 
the same direction, so that Gökalp can manage the homogeneous internationality without 
accepting cosmopolitanism. And as religion is a part of culture,
88
 it plays a shared role with 
other social spheres in differentiating each national culture and preventing cosmopolitanism. 
Although the relative importance of religion in this shared role is to be discussed, but it seems 
established that Gökalp’s secular argument acknowledges that religion, properly understood, 
still works to do in the new internationality of science. 
To summarize, Gökalp’s pro-separation argument is very systematic and 
comprehensive. It is argued from both religious and secular positions. And each position 
cordially embraces the other: the secular argument recognizes the proper function of religion 
as the source of inspiration or the source of transcendent values, and the religious argument 
ensures the exclusive role of state, particularly the exclusivity of legislative power. Also, both 
arguments deal with different levels of analysis: private and public, national and international, 
historical and futuristic, philosophical and institutional. That Gökalp approaches separation 
from multiple directions further evinces that he is a genuine proponent of separation, who 
worked it out as far as his intellectual terrain could extend. 
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3.2. Integration 
 
To be fair, Gökalp has another textual strand, which may sound dissonant with his 
pro-separation argument. Particularly, he intends to integrate national culture and state 
legislation. The integration of culture and state can mean many different things, but when the 
culture is excessively religious, it is possible to speculate on whether to bring religion into 
state legislation through cultural arguments. For example, the requirement of Ottoman 
Turkish courses in public schools in Turkey can be argued as cultural legislation by 
proponents, but can be criticized as religious legislation by opponents. In US, ‘culture war’ is 
a popular phrase to describe the secular-religious division. Culture thus often emerges as an 
ambiguous sphere in which religion and state can’t easily draw their border. Gökalp also has 
the cultural arguments, which seems to promote Islam in state legislation. I first present this 
textual strand critically, but later argue that Gökalp is still a genuine separatist, as far as we 
consider American separation model genuine. 
Since the question asks how three components—religion, culture and state—are 
integrated, it is convenient to work through a twofold process: between culture and state; and 
between culture and religion. For the first integration, Gökalp says, “[t]he state, which is the 
sum total of the institutions of law, should in its ideal form be national, like culture. But this 
ideal form has scarcely materialized up to our time.”89 Elsewhere Gökalp argues that, 
although Turkism is not a political party movement but a cultural movement, it can’t remain 
apolitical, but should be political in partner with populism to materialize cultural ideals.
90
 
Here Gökalp doesn’t deals with political culture, which operates outside formal institutions, 
but speaks of legislating cultural taste in national level. Apparently, this move reverses his 
argument on the evolution of mores—that cultural mores should be separated from political 
mores.
91
 When culture is thus charged by politics, it can turn into an enforced culture, in 
which the line between censorship and sponsorship becomes blurred. For example, in North 
Korea, all cultural activities are state-controlled, meaning both fully censored and fully 
funded by the state. The enforced national culture also becomes problematic for our subject 
when it lacks pluralistic consideration especially when multicultural social blocks, which 
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often involve religious minorities, contend for symbolic presence in public sphere. If the 
enforced national culture unevenly favors any particular position, the rest of society would 
dissatisfy. 
The dissatisfaction would worsen by that Gökalp integrates national culture with 
Islamic religion, which constitutes the second part of the twofold process. If a national culture 
is to be legislated, and if the national culture is too religious with Islam, the final cultural 
legislation would end up being like integrating religion and state. To be sure, since the 
cultural influence of Islam has been immense throughout the centuries of the Ottoman 
Empire, it is inevitable to embrace some degree of Islamic components in Turkish national 
culture. The question is a matter of degree. And, relatively speaking, Gökalp integrates 
religion and culture too tightly. When an argument explicitly mentions a ‘one-to-one’ relation 
or a coterminous, superposed identity between two spheres, we can say that the degree of 
integration goes stronger than a merely mutual influence. There are three textual points to 
show such strong integration. 
First, Gökalp sees too much overlap between cultural and religious spheres. Before 
reading the text, let’s first recall that Gökalp distinguishes the eight major social spheres: 
religious, aesthetic, linguistic, among others.
92
 Gökalp relates some of these social spheres: 
[L]anguage is the carrier of ideas and sentiments…hence, those who speak 
the same language share the same aspirations, the same consciousness, and 
the same mentality. Individuals thus sharing common and homogeneous 
sentiments are also naturally prone to profess the same faith. It is because of 
this that language groups in many cases are of the same religion.”93  
 
The text relates linguistic, aesthetic and religious spheres. Notice that the adjective ‘same’ 
repeats too many times, and ultimately creates a kind of identity between language and 
religion. Although Gökalp provides a list of language-religion groups as empirical data,
94
 the 
list involves the sampling problem that Gökalp excludes important counterevidence like 
Arabic-speaking Copts or German-speaking Jews. As the data includes the more eastward 
countries, like India or China, this identity between language and religion is getting more 
weakened.  
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Second, Gökalp maintains the dominant influence of religion over national culture. 
“Religion is the most important factor in the creation of national consciousness as it unites 
men through common sentiments and beliefs. It is because of this that genuinely religious 
men are those who have national fervor, and that genuine nationalists are those who believe 
in the eternity of faith.”95 The text shows a two-way identity between religion and national 
culture: religion decides culture, and culture decides religion. But apparently religion takes a 
leading or uniting role. How does religion become such the superlative class among the eight 
major social spheres of Gökalp? In the immediate context of the quote, Gökalp argues that 
religion removes individuality through negative rituals, e.g. purification, and creates 
collectivity through positive rituals, e.g. public prayers.
96
 In other words, the function of 
religion is not only to be a player within the religious sphere but also to contribute for 
collectivity itself, so that it can promote the collectivity itself for all the other social spheres. 
Third, Gökalp homogenizes Turkish national culture with Islamic civilization. 
Gökalp says, “the first dogma of our social catechism must be: I am a member of the Turkish 
nation, the Islamic community and Western civilization.”97 This dogma actually separates 
religion and state, if it is read by an individual Muslim. The three social spheres of religion, 
culture and state are more or less distinguished in the threefold structure of the dogma. But, if 
it is collectively applied to Turkish people, it homogenizes Turkish culture with Islam—all 
Turks should be the members of the Islamic community. Furthermore, the dogma puts Islam 
above Turkish nation by subjecting it under ‘the Islamic community’, ümmet. The notion of 
ümmet is to be received as a proper noun, rather than a general description of a loosely united 
confederation of Muslim communities across the world. It is a kind of religious 
internationality, which takes nations as its member unit, rather than taking Muslim 
communities in each nation. Gökalp envisions, “[a]ll the Muslim nations would be united 
into a great religious community under the name of Muhammadan ümmet.”98 Gökalp can’t 
accept such pseudo internationality because he already made the religion-based 
internationality obsolete. To be sure, the idea of ümmet liberates the Caliphate from each 
ruler of Muslim nations, so that a sort of separation of religion and state is implemented in the 
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level of the international body of Muslims.
99
 However, when Gökalp imports the idea of 
ümmet to his dogma for Turkism, he domestically homogenizes the national culture with 
Islam, and thus gives up the cultural authority to this particular historical application of 
Islamic internationality. 
So far I have cast as skeptically as possible how Gökalp integrates—identifies, 
dominates, and homogenizes—culture with Islam. This reverses Gökalp’s trajectory in which 
cultural spheres are to be separated from religious and political authorities. More importantly, 
in connection with his intention for cultural legislation, one can speculate whether Gökalp 
wants Islamic legislation through cultural arguments. The skeptical reading certainly 
contrasts with his pro-separation arguments. To be sure, his pro-separation arguments also 
include religious components, which make his position genuine. In the skeptical reading, 
however, religion doesn’t separate but integrates all the other social spheres. How do we 
reconcile his pro-separation arguments with his integrative approach to all three social 
spheres? 
 
3.3. Reconciliation 
 
A minimalistic approach simply encapsulates his pro-separation arguments from all 
the other texts. This approach is valid if the study aims to collect non-Western philosophical 
works supporting separation. Gökalp’s pro-separation arguments themselves are important 
data for those who want to find non-Western thinkers who sought out separation. A thinker 
may change one’s own thoughts during his or her lifespan, but tracing such change is another 
project, which is distinctive from collecting non-Western thoughts for separation. In fact, it is 
likely to be a fallacious ad hominem to reject his pro-separation arguments all together 
simply because he has expressed his personal hope on Islam and Turkish national culture in 
other essays. Gökalp was a prolific writer, who wrote all kinds of genres from poems to 
positivistic social science. Alongside with his genre spectrum, the degree of integration (or 
separation) among the three social spheres, i.e. culture, religion and politics, also varies. His 
poems often integrate all the three as a call for religious war, while his social science can be 
as secular as Emile Durkheim’s sociology. In-between two extremes, his expository essays on 
religion and culture may vary in the degree of separation based on different audiences. 
Among all these texts with different audiences and genres, it is absurd to evaluate his 
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separation position by his religious poems; and it’s also relatively absurd to judge his 
separation idea by his other essays blending religion, culture and politics. In short, if we want 
to figure out Gökalp’s separation position, we need to focus on what he said about separation 
instead of what he said about something else. 
The minimalistic approach suits the purpose of this paper, but it is indifferent to the 
troubling textual strand, which homogenizes Turkey with Islamic culture. However, given 
that the Western separation thesis overemphasizes the influence of Islamic religiosity in the 
regional politics and that the culture wars between Islamists and secularists recur in Turkish 
politics, the textual strand seems too remarkable to be ignored for separation debates. To 
solve this strand, I offer two other approaches. First, taking his homogenizing intention as 
original to his thought, I try a liberal defense for his pro-separation position. Second, the 
crisis context of Balkan war can explain the change in his thought from pluralism to 
nationalism. 
First, the liberal defense begins with the particular distinction between public reason 
and comprehensive doctrines, as presented by John Rawls, and argues that the sort of 
secularism which accepts Rawls’ distinction between public reason and comprehensive 
doctrine cannot criticize Gökalp’s pro-integration arguments. By comprehensive doctrines 
Rawls means many irreconcilable philosophical systems held by different citizens of a 
democratic society. Being comprehensive, such doctrines must include a certain position on 
personal, interpersonal and political issues. If any doctrine has no political position at all, it is 
not comprehensive, and therefore escapes political debates. By public reason Rawls means 
many complex concepts, but the most salient features for our discussion are straightforward. 
First, public reason must be specific—dealing with specific legislative or institutional 
questions. Second, public reason must use the public language accessible to all parties, rather 
than reasoning solely from each doctrinal position. Third, public reason must press on to the 
extent of building up civic friendship, meaning, any solution proposed by public reason 
should be not just agreeable to but also acceptable by all comprehensive doctrines 
involved.
100
 The proper relation between comprehensive doctrine and public reason is 
therefore that the former embeds in the latter, but neither that two become completely united, 
nor that either of the two fully exhausts the other. Public reason and comprehensive doctrines 
can be completely united only in a totalitarian society, where there is no doctrinal difference 
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on any issue. But when a comprehensive doctrine embeds in public reason, the doctrine 
becomes compatible with a democratic polity by the virtue of its embedding into public 
reason. In Rawls’ own words, “public reason neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive 
doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the 
essentials of public reason and a democratic polity.”101 In other words, if Gökalp’s entire 
thoughts, including both pro-separation and pro-integration arguments, can meet the 
requirements of the comprehensive doctrine that is compatible with the particular notion of 
public reason, any secularist who accepts the sort of political liberalism presented by John 
Rawls doesn’t need to criticize Gökalp’s pro-integration thoughts, which would then become 
a part of the compatible comprehensive doctrine. 
Gökalp’s pro-separation argument meets the three features of public reason. First, it 
deals with the specific institutional issues of Caliphate and Minister of Religious Affairs. 
Second, its language is not esoteric based on Quran or Sharia, but commonly accessible to all. 
To be sure, Gökalp deals with Quran or Sharia as a problem domain, but when he does, he 
speaks as sociology of religion, rather than filling up his arguments with religious jargons. 
Finally, his pro-separation argument is argued from both Muslim and secular positions in a 
way to be acceptable by both positions. The actual acceptance rate would depend on many 
factors, but it would suffice to point out that his arguments are presented in a way toward 
both Muslims and secularists. Having the pro-separation argument embedded in public reason, 
his comprehensive doctrine becomes compatible with the democratic polity specified by 
Rawls. Then, any secularist who accepts this particular notion of liberal philosophy doesn’t 
need to criticize the rest of his thoughts, regardless of how much they are religiously 
propagating in non-public reason. 
The liberal defense has another layer focusing on Gökalp as an individual. I think we 
should see Gökalp fulfilling the civic duty of translating one’s religious arguments into public 
reason. By this civic duty of translation I mean that democratic citizens may freely have 
religious or secular philosophies, but when they speak in public sphere, they must translate 
their ideas in a way to be accessible to all. This civic duty contains more or less the same 
content with the previous argument, but focuses on individual ethic concerning public reason. 
John Rawls called the use of public reason to achieve the overlapping consensus among 
diverse comprehensive philosophies or background cultures as the ‘duty of civility’ for all 
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democratic citizens.
102
 Audi argues that the institutional principle of separation must be 
accompanied by individual citizens’ commitment to that principle, and these commitments 
include not only secular rationale, i.e. formal compatibility with the separation principles, but 
also secular motivation to enhance the separation principle.
103
 It is actually Habermas who 
picks up the word ‘translation’ for the same civic duty.104 I like the word translation because 
it captures the coexistence of both secular and religious arguments. It also implies a 
substantial intellectual effort to translate between two different philosophical systems, so that 
it deserves to be called a duty, i.e. a cost. Being an intellectual work, the civic duty of the 
translation may let scholars vary about the expected quality of translation. Habermas even 
argues that, when the religious don’t have any alternative secular translation but believe that 
they have a certain moral content which would benefit society, they should be allowed to 
utter religious expression.
105
 Audi would not accept this argument, as he demands secular 
rational as the least commitment of citizen. While two scholars thus differ in their expectation 
on the quality of the translation, they all expect that the religious should at least try their best 
to translate their ideals into public reason. 
Applying this civic duty of translation to Gökalp, I don’t mean that Gökalp was self-
conscious of this duty as liberalism articulates after his death. I just evaluate what Gökalp is 
doing can be seen as the example of fulfilling this civic duty. This is not an anachronistic 
reflection. A search for exemplary figures fulfilling the civic translation doesn’t have to limit 
its search period to post-Habermas era. There could have been many political communicators, 
who fulfilled this duty, trying to interface the religious reasoning and secular reasoning in 
public sphere earlier than the emergence of liberalism. I think Gökalp is one of such 
candidates who exemplify how to actually do this civic duty. 
So, from the perspective of this civic duty, we can see that Gökalp’s pro-separation 
arguments are the outcome of the civic translation, while the bluntly pro-Islamic arguments in 
his poems or cultural expositions are not translated. Having both the translated and 
untranslated texts never makes his civic translation less genuine. In contrast, it proves that he 
has worked out to translate because we all know that Gökalp is openly religious. When a 
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person writes only secular arguments, there is no way for us to know that any intellectual, 
civic translation took place in his or her mind. But when a person is openly religious in a 
verifiable manner, e.g. publishing religious texts, we can test and critique this individual 
writer on whether fulfilling the civic duty of translation. Every religious writer is vulnerable 
in this sense to involve public sphere because his or her political arguments will be 
continuously compared and contrasted with one’s own religious opinions uttered in different 
contexts. Nevertheless, Gökalp passes the test by contributing his public reason to endorse 
separation. Regarding the quality of his civic translation, recall that Gökalp preceded those 
liberal thinkers. This certainly adjusts our expectation on the quality of his civic translation. 
There could be some discrepancy between Gökalp and the 20
th
 century liberal theorists, but, 
in their thrusts, Gökalp’s civic translation can exemplify for those who want to communicate 
between secularity and religiosity in liberal tradition. 
But the parallel between liberalism and Gökalp’s ideas should not be exaggerated 
because the latter are not pluralistic. Even though Gökalp shows the civic friendship between 
two doctrines, i.e. secularism and Islam, it seems that there is no room for Christian, Jewish 
or other religious communities in his theory. This leads us to the last approach to reconcile 
between his pro-separation and pro-integration arguments. The last approach applies the 
crisis context of Balkan wars to his thoughts, and argues that his religious homogenization 
was not the direct outcome of philosophical reflection but a response to the Balkan crisis. I 
begin with historical context, and move on to Gökalp’s own texts to show how he himself 
reflects the historical crisis. 
First, the Ottoman Empire maintained the millet system, in which, not only Muslims 
but also the persecuted French Protestants, known as Huguenots, or Anatolian Jewish 
communities were protected. The millet system was not perfect, and it often functioned as a 
communal segregation. However, situated in its own time when there was no Muslim 
community at all in any part of Western European states, it was a quite pluralistic and 
tolerating institution to embrace Christianity, Judaism and Islam. It could evolve as American 
separation model, in which diverse religious communities coexist based on the principle of 
separation. The composition of the first parliament of the second Constitutional era shows 
this possibility: it was multi-religious, including Armenian, Greek and Jewish deputies.
106
 
However, a further step toward pluralism became inconceivable due to the dissolution 
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process of Ottoman Empire, the process which is largely initiated by a series of wars in the 
Balkan region with the political entities identified as Christians, i.e. Russians and other 
Balkan Christians, etc. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu notes, “they [Turkish population in Balkan] learnt 
about nationalism from their Greek and Slav Christian neighbors the hard way,” and provides 
the data on the massive casualties, refuges and forced migration during the Russom-Ottoman 
war and the Balkan wars.
107
 In short, the pluralistic Ottoman structure was dissolved into a 
homogenous Muslim Turkish nation by the domestic and international crises largely led by 
Christian entities, rather than purely by the will of Turks.
108
 Contrast to the Anglophone 
context, in which diverse religious communities contested to live together, Gökalp had to deal 
with the different context in which Christian communities wanted to leave the Empire 
through the wars. In Rawlsian terms, Gökalp had begun his life with the polity of modus 
vivendi, i.e. the unwilling concession among diverse religious groups under the Ottoman 
millet system, but unfortunately, he could not enter a proviso, a friendly coexistence of 
diverse groups, and had to retreat to a nation with a single religion. 
Notice that this historical speculation vividly appears in Gökalp’s own mind. Gökalp 
says, “[w]hen Turkish thinkers entertained the idea of Ottoman nationality composed of 
different religious communities, they did not feel the necessity of Islamization, but as soon as 
the ideal of Turkism arose, the need for Islamization made itself felt.”109 Apparently, there 
was a transition from pluralism to nationalism. The immediate cause of this transition, 
according to Gökalp, is of course the Balkan wars.
110
 Yet, understanding some 
characteristics of this transition would be more important than knowing its cause. First, it was 
a crisis theory for an abnormal situation. Gökalp, expounding the philosophical structure of 
the ideal of Turkism, argues that “the time of crisis” is “the period of germination of the 
ideals.”111 Gökalp goes on, “[w]hen a nation experiences a great disaster or when it is 
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confronted with grave danger, individual personality disappears and becomes immersed in 
society. In such times it is only the national personality which lives in the soul of the 
individual.”112 Thus, Gökalp self-consciously justifies the nationalistic transition by pointing 
out that it is not the outcome of individual reflection but that of national crisis. That he had to 
justify this transition presupposes that he considered nationalism not as a norm but as 
abnormality. Likewise, the nationalistic turn was a reluctant transition. Gökalp explains,  
“[T]he Turks were reluctant, in the beginning, to endanger a reality [i.e. 
Ottoman state] for the sake of an ideal [i.e. nationalism]. Thus, Turkish 
thinkers believed not in Turkism but in Ottomanism . . . The Turks’ 
avoidance of the idea of nationalism was not only harmful for the state and 
irritating to the diverse nationalities, but it was fatal for the Turks 
themselves.”113  
 
In other words, Turks reluctantly waited as long as possible to adopt homogeneous 
nationalism until their reluctance hurt themselves. For many ethnic Turks, nationalism as a 
new political philosophy doesn’t make sense because they already have been running their 
own state for centuries.
114
 Nationalism appears as a novel idea and an opportunity only to 
those who didn’t have their own nation-state. But for those who already have their own state 
consisting of multiple ethnic groups, nationalism is not just an academic idea but a threat. 
Thus when Gökalp records this transition with the word ‘reluctance’, his word choice reflects 
both unwillingness and necessity felt by Turkish thinkers concerning this homogeneous 
transition. 
Bernard Lewis also notes that Ottoman elites were more interested in Western 
European-style heterogeneous patriotism, while the Christian communities in Ottoman 
Empire were applying Eastern European-style homogeneous nationalism to have 
independence from the Empire. Although Ottoman elites were thus conscious of the 
possibility of forming a heterogeneous modern society, after the wars with Christian 
communities, the idea of homogeneous nationalism gained more influence in Turkish 
intellectuals, according to Lewis.
115
 Ebru Boyar also notes that Turkish historians including 
Gökalp were searching for ‘a common soul’ amid chaotic intellectual terrains after the 
Balkan disaster, and therefore it is unfair to suppose, according to Boyar, that Turkish 
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nationalism already has emerged as a systematic and dominant ideology during Gökalp’s 
period.
116
 In short, there was self-conscious, reluctant and painful transition from pluralism 
to homogeneous nationalism in Gökalp as well as other contemporaries. This transition must 
provide an interpretive layer to adjust Gökalp’s homogenizing voice in the changing context. 
Although we don’t have any detailed theory from Gökalp to stipulate a pluralistic separation 
model, it is possible to speculate that the millet system and the first multi-religious parliament 
could have evolved toward the liberal notion of overlapping consensus. This speculation is 
not overstretched because Gökalp’s context prior to the Balkan crisis was the unique place in 
which three Abrahamic religions and diverse Islamic sects were actually rubbing their 
shoulders together. A search for a better political framework to embrace diverse communities 
was hardly an ivory tower imagination but a very local question, with which Gökalp and 
others were struggling to answer, although the question itself disappeared through the 
unfolding crisis even before articulating their answers. 
So far I have attempted to reconcile Gökalp’s religiously homogenizing texts with 
his pro-separation arguments in three different ways. However, these reconciliation efforts 
neither need to be apologetic to defend Gökalp, nor eclipse the main purpose of this chapter, 
which systematically presents Gökalp’s separation idea from his texts. Solving all these 
puzzling textual strands by the theme of separation is just one way to aid us to learn his 
separation idea. As opposing views often refine one’s arguments, confronting his pro-
integration texts can refine our understanding of his pro-separation arguments. Some readers 
may still consider Gökalp an Islamist, if they believe his pro-integration texts are more 
significant than his pro-separation arguments. However, having all these textual and 
contextual surveys, I cannot help but concluding that Gökalp shows the strong textual 
consistency to support separation, particularly in that his arguments are multifaceted to cover 
religious, secular, institutional and individual aspects to support separation. Among these 
contributions, the most distinctive point is to mediate secularity and religiosity through Sufi-
idealism, which elevates the role of religion ironically by delegating the exclusive legislative 
power to state.  
In lieu of summary, Gökalp’s separation is comparable with Kant, as Gökalp himself 
compares sufism with idealism. Both thinkers separate legality from religious morality. Yet, 
their separation does not mean the extinction of morality or religion. Although Kant rejects 
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Biblical revelation as the source of legality, he still maintains the absolute moral standard, 
namely, categorical imperatives, which stem from self-legislation. Richard Bernstein thus 
argues that Kant became the champion for both the secular and the religious because the 
separation provides a neutral platform for moral reasoning.
117
 By this separation of legality 
and religious morality, Kant, according to Bernstein, encourages the religious not to fear the 
Enlightenment but to engage their religion with the language of the Enlightenment. At the 
same time, Kant warns the secular elites not to suppose that they already know everything but 
to open their minds for transcendental possibilities. Berstein’s reading of Kant is similar with 
my reading of Gökalp’s sufi-idealism. Although Gökalp affirms the exclusive legislative 
power of state, he maintains that religion should guide society with transcendent ideals 
exploring unknown areas of human knowledge. The comparison between Gökalp and Kant 
also reminds us of one important feature of American separation model. There was an 
efficient philosophical proxy between secularity and religiosity in American case, namely, 
commonsense moral reasoning. As this commonsense reasoning was widely accepted by the 
religious intellectuals in America, Gökalp’s sufi-idealism also appears as a good candidate 
for the philosophical proxy, by which both the secular and the religious in Turkey can 
converse each other in public sphere without appealing to Quranic verses. Furthermore, 
reading the history of separation concept through the three philosophical systems, which 
encouraged separation in three different contexts, can prevent the whole debates from 
collapsing into historical contingency. 
Evinced by Gökalp’s contributions, we can now reject the popular thesis that 
separation of religion and state is a Western phenomenon, foreign to Islamic culture. The next 
section further deconstructs the popular thesis by cross-cultural comparison. 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPARISON 
 
 
This section has two focal points. First, it compares Gökalp’s separation with 
American and French models. To be sure, this comparison is suggested by Gökalp himself, as 
he argues that French secularism is problematic, while Islamic and Protestant models are 
similar with each other to reconcile themselves with modernity.
118
 To be sure, America and 
Protestant are not synonym, but the former can function as an ideal-typical case of Protestant-
majority culture in this comparison, and Gökalp also cites America as a Protestant nation. 
The second focus of this section falls on the meta-comparison on many comparative claims 
made by Gökalp and others in this paper. 
By now the proximity between Gökalp and American separation has been suggested 
in many ways. For example, the previous section interpreted Gökalp in comparison with 
Anglophone liberal thinkers such as John Rawls. In the earlier literature review, I also have 
addressed many comparative data on American and French models, and the affinity between 
Gökalp and American separation would have echoed by far. Table 2 summarizes those data 
by three ideal-typical categories: 
American Separation French Separation 
 Religion-friendly  Secularism-friendly 
 Pluralistic  Homogeneous 
 Translating  Transforming 
Table 2. American and French Separation Models 
 
By religion-friendly I mean that American separation model is both demanded by and 
favorable to religious communities. It’s not unusual to meet American scholars who argue 
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that secularity itself has religious origin.
119
 In contrast, French secularism was initiated by 
secularists, not by the Catholic majority, and often targets the religious communities. 
Pluralistic and homogenous capture not only the religious-demographic context of the two 
models but also their contents: French model, when it goes militant, aims to secularize the 
whole country, while American model aims to ensure pluralism. The last column, which 
compares the discursive style, is extended from the previous discussion on the civic duty of 
translation, which is more discussed in Anglophone liberal tradition. The widespread of 
commonsense moral reasoning in the early America is also analogues to this point. On the 
transformative style of French secularism, I depend on Laborde, who argues that French 
secularism, as a comprehensive moral system, sought to transform all the non-secular citizens, 
e.g. the religious, peasants, etc. to be a perfect secular citizen mainly through education.
120
  
With this frame, Gökalp’s separation idea can be qualified as religion-friendly, 
homogenous and translating, which makes Gökalp closer to America than France. However, 
since this comparison only describes the relative distance among the three separation models, 
researchers should not judge Gökalp’s idea exclusively based on a particular model. For 
example, if an observer measures Gökalp’s separation idea through the French model, it falls 
short because it allows religious transcendence in public sphere. And if another does it 
through the American model, Gökalp now falls short by the lack of religious pluralism.
121
 
Combining these two types of observation, Western observers would mingle between 
American and French models, and want to assert that Gökalp’s idea is neither secular nor 
pluralistic, therefore, falling short to either standard. However, such eclecticism is unfair 
because there is no clear ground to decide which separation model is superior to the other. 
Does the American separation model satisfy the requirements of French secularism, or does 
French secularism do vice versa? These questions are unknowable in the sense that America 
doesn’t have the Catholic majority as France, and France doesn’t have Protestant majority as 
America. Unless we have a linear standard to evaluate diverse separation models on this 
globe, the comparative conclusion only reflects the relativity embedded in different 
separation models, the relativity which illuminates the complexity of the concept and the 
historical contingency in various regional contexts. 
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So, relatively speaking, Gökalp’s separation is somewhere in the middle of 
American and French cases, but slightly leans toward the American model. His proposal to 
separate—but not abolish—the Caliphate from the supreme sovereignty certainly sounds like 
American separation, but the establishment of Director of Religious Affair is similar with that 
French state has been supporting Catholic institutions even after 1905 Separation Laws. This 
comparative conclusion must sound redundant by now, but the point is that my independent 
review of Gökalp’s separation idea and two representative Western models indeed turns out 
to show the strong affinity between Sufi-Islamic and American separation models. As far as 
the American separation model is acceptable in scholarly debates, Gökalp’s Sufi-Islamic 
separation can refute again the widely held claim that separation is only a Western 
phenomenon, foreign to Islam. It’s not. 
Apart from this affinity between Gökalp and American model, there is a meta-
comparison problem, which appears when all the other comparative claims of this paper face 
at each other. Two other comparative claims can be distinguished within the popular thesis, 
i.e. the absence of separation outside the West. Although both Western and Islamic scholars 
maintain the popular thesis, they actually differ in what they presuppose. Western scholars, 
e.g. Lewis, Huntington, etc., usually hold social differentiation theory or other notions of 
social progress to explain their separation thesis. Arguing from such premises, they actually 
implicate that Islamic society is less progressed when they assert that separation is absent in 
Islamic societies. On the other hand, some Islamic scholars, e.g. Tariq Ramadan, agree with 
the absence of separation in the Islamic societies, but they do so because they perceive 
separation primarily as the absence of moral foundation in the society.
122
 So, when Islamic 
scholars reject the separation thesis because of its seemingly foreign origin, they actually 
implicate that the Western societies have lost moral foundation by separation, and therefore 
are less moral than Islamic societies. In short, the popular thesis, though widely held by both 
Western and Islamic scholars, reveals two competing views of other—‘the Islamic society is 
less progressed’ versus ‘the Western society is immoral.’ 
Gökalp’s separation argument rejects both comparative claims in the popular thesis. 
Using social differentiation, he argues that Islamic societies have progressed enough to 
distinguish different spheres of life, and even traces back to the earliest phase of Islam to 
show that the distinction between legal periphery and religious core was one of the first 
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differentiations that Islam had made. Using sufi-idealsim, he also argues that separation is 
better for Islamic moral reasoning.  
Gökalp’s antithetical relation to two contentious comparative claims in the popular 
thesis should be marked as an important contribution for separation debates, but the meta-
comparison also unpacks Gökalp’s own comparative claim that Protestant approaches are 
better than French secularism because Protestant states adopted Islamic social principles.
123
 
Apparently, it is difficult to affirm the diffusion of the separation concept from Islam to the 
West.
124
 But the rest of Gökalp’s comparative analysis on church-state models of the West 
still holds, and provides another meta-comparative point.  
Gökalp argues that French laicism is the culmination of an inherent instability of 
Christianity, while Protestant separation model is the culmination of Islamic influence, which 
had begun by the Crusaders and gradually transformed the Catholic-dominant European 
society. His argument stands on the comparative theological analysis that Islam embraces but 
distinguishes law and state, and by so doing, creates no tension between two spheres within 
its religiosity. In contrast, Christianity has an inherent dualistic tension between sacred and 
secular because it had begun as a religious movement under Roman Empire. From the 
beginning, Christianity had to conflict with political power, but even after it finally acquired 
the political power, the incipient dualism continued to distort the proper relation between 
church and state. Gökalp concludes that, even though French laicism is the best possible 
outcome of Christianity in its attempt to reconcile with modern state, it certainly falls short, 
and becomes “a grave source of sickness for French nation.”125 But Protestants, thanks to the 
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Islamic influence initiated by the Crusaders, were able to build a better relation between 
church and state. 
Conceptually speaking, Gökalp sounds correct to say that Protestantism opposes the 
dualism between sacred and secular, as Islam does so. For Gökalp, the rejection of this 
dualism is important to build his separation idea from within his religious conviction. If state 
exists totally outside religion, Gökalp cannot say much of it from within his religion. Besides, 
the way to embrace state under religion doesn’t have to be legislative. Sufi-idealism can 
embrace state into religion by non-legal, transcendent approaches. Similarly, Protestantism, 
particularly, Calvinism, opposes the dualistic division between the sacred and secular, and 
thus teaches the priesthood of all believers and the sacredness of all vocations. If a politician 
is equally sacred with a priest, this Calvinist politician doesn’t have to use religious language 
in public sphere to be a full politician as God’s call. Using secular reasoning in court room is 
equally sacred with using biblical reasoning in church for Calvinist politicians. Sufi-idealistic 
and Calvinistic politicians in public sphere thus may end up with speaking the same language, 
i.e. secular language, although their motivations would differ. 
Historically speaking, the direction of diffusing the separation concept is hard to 
know, but Gökalp still sounds correct in that Christianity had experienced violent sectarian 
conflicts, often involving political authorities. However, Gökalp interprets the meaning of 
these religious conflicts differently from John Rawls, who argues that the religious conflicts 
became the source of conceiving pluralistic society in Europe.
126
 In contrast, Gökalp 
interprets them as the outcome of the inherent defect of Christianity. How can we understand 
this difference? I think the comparative claim of Gökalp should be understood as his 
polemical engagement against the popular thesis, which was already presented to Gökalp in 
his own time. According to Gökalp, Europeans often compared Christianity and Islam, and 
argued that Islam lacks of separation, calling it ‘a defect’.127 Gökalp, in a response this 
charge, shows the existence of Islamic separation model, but also polemically presses on to 
demonstrate that the most chapters of Christian history actually has not separated church and 
state, but integrated them to the point of exploding religious conflicts. To repeat, while John 
Rawls takes these religious conflicts as the source of conceiving European pluralism, Gökalp 
takes them as the evidence of the long absence of separation in Europe. Polemics thus come 
out even between two civilizations, but there is something more, I think, in Gökalp’s mind. 
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Gökalp’s polemical subversion to put Islamic separation above the most Western models can 
bring a pedagogical impact to some Muslims who still view that separation is foreign. Gökalp 
would say, “It’s actually ours, and ours are better,” to persuade some Muslim folks to 
embrace the political change of separation. 
So far I have gathered four comparative claims concerning separation. Let’s put 
them all together for a meta-comparison. The popular Western thesis (e.g. Lewis, Huntington) 
says that Islam has no separation, and, in so doing, implies that Islamic societies have less 
progressed. The popular Islamic thesis (e.g. Ramadan) says that Islam has no separation, and 
implies that the West has lost moral foundation for their society. Gökalp refutes the popular 
Western thesis by showing that Islam has separation, and even counters it saying that the 
West doesn’t have what they claim to have. Gökalp also refutes the popular Islamic thesis by 
saying that separation is not foreign, and Islam has its own separation, in which Islamic moral 
reasoning, e.g. sufi-idealism, is still effectual. Finally, add-on to this meta-view the different 
attitudes of American and French citizens about other’s separation, as revealed in the poll 
about the French ban of headscarf. Concerning this ban, they not just disagree but disapprove 
each other about what is secular state. This extended meta-view shows that, like many other 
political concepts, separation is the essentially contested notion; and others (i.e. foreigners) 
often see better any area lacking separation than self-reflection does. Furthermore, people 
from different backgrounds can easily misunderstand terms and scopes when they discuss 
separation, and this miscommunication easily turns into a mutual demeaning against each 
other. Knowing this possible miscommunication, a researcher is warned to be careful in 
evaluating the degree of separation in different cultures, as revealed in this meta-comparison. 
To that end, studying Gökalp’s separation idea, which covers so many aspects of the topic, 
certainly helps researchers to capture the multiple fronts of conceptual contestation across 
different cultures.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Gökalp’s separation idea relays between the Tanzimat and Atatürk’s reform. Niyazi 
Berkes and Halil İnalcık highlight that the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) conceived the 
dualistic secularism,
128
 against which Gökalp’s idea particularly reflects. By the dualistic 
secularism they mean two things. First, the Tanzimat reform applied French legal codes to 
create the first secular court for commercial affairs and codify Islamic laws for religious 
affairs. The reform was certainly one step forward to secularization, but it resulted in a dual 
legal system, i.e. the coexistence of secular and religious laws. The boundary between two 
laws was often unclear to cause a great confusion. Second, in parallel with the dual legal 
system, a social division between Western-secularists and Muslims worsened because 
Ottoman Muslims suffered a relatively disadvantageous position compared to non-Muslim 
millets. By the new secular law of the Tanzimat, non-Muslims were able to enjoy more 
freedom from their own religious authority, while Muslims had not benefited themselves 
under the same Ottoman state but with the dual laws.
129
 This unevenness practically favored 
non-Muslims to expand commercial activities with Europe, which was now demanding 
Ottoman Empire to secularize millets for their economic interest.
130
 Muslims, on the other 
hand, had to wait for their adaptation in new markets due to the tight control of the Ottoman 
state.
131
 The dualistic secularism, i.e. legal and social divisions caused by the new secular 
laws, according to Berkes, was not the original intention of the Tanzimat reform, which tried 
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to avoid the dualism of power as in Western church-state separation but applied a functional 
distinction between temporal and religious affairs within the one polity consisting of multiple 
religious communities.
132
 Yet, it ended up with creating a new kind of dualism between 
Western-secularists and Muslim-traditionalists. Suffering this failure of the dualistic 
secularism, anti-Tanzimat movements arose. Among them, the Young Ottomans, e.g. Namık 
Kemal and Ziya Paşa, argued that the unchecked westernization must be resisted, and the 
dual legal system must be repealed—but by fully modernizing Islamic law.133  
It is unnecessary to work through the historical detail of two Constitutional eras, in 
which the dualistic tension mutates its shape in different ways. Instead, the separation debates 
around the Tanzimat and the post-Tanzimat periods show how Gökalp elevated the debates 
into a new level. Like Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa, Gökalp rejects the dual legal system. 
However, unlike these two, Gökalp rejects to modernize Islamic laws to repeal the dual 
system. For Gökalp, it must be only secular law to be implemented in state, and the 
monopoly of secular law is the best way for Gökalp to strengthen the Islamic heritage of 
Turkey. Like the Tanzimat, Gökalp avoids the dualistic church-state relation of the West. 
Unlike the Tanzimat, however, Gökalp sees the inner complexity within Western church-state 
relations, and shows the four different ways of interfacing religion and state in the West. 
Knowing this inner diversity, Gökalp argues that French legal codes somehow intensify the 
dualistic tension concerning religion, while Protestant models look compatible with his 
Islamic understanding of religion-state relation. If the West is conceived as a chunk, the 
failure of the Tanzimat also appears as the problem of the Westernization in its totality, and 
the critical response to the Tanzimat also turns into a dualistic contestation against the West 
as a whole, as many Young Ottomans did so. However, if the West is internally distinguished 
as in Gökalp’s arguments, the critical response can narrow down deeper problems in the 
reform process. It’s not the West in general, but the dualistic tendency of legalism is to be 
resisted not only for Turks but also for Europeans, Gökalp argues.
134
 Similarly, Gökalp 
distinguishes the different species of Islam—not in sectarian but in sociological category—to 
argue that the imperial Islam is weaker than the private-focused Islam. In short, against the 
backdrop of the Tanzimat and anti-Tanzimat arguments, Gökalp engaged both Islam and the 
West by avoiding both Occidentalism and Orientalism, so that he could particularize the 
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deeper problems of the reform, and generalize the separation debates into an abstract, 
conceptual interplay between legality and non-legality. 
Finally, what can Gökalp’s separation idea say about modern Turkish politics? 
Concerning Atatürk’s reform and the early republican elites, it is often suggested that Turkish 
secularism followed the similar step with French laicism. Kuru calls this as ‘assertive 
secularism’ against Catholic and Sunni majorities in each country respectively. I don’t 
comment about Kuru’s qualification on Turkish secularism, but simply add that Gökalp’s 
separation idea suggests that any assertive turn was not necessary but contingent to historical 
context. If we locate ourselves in Gökalp’s time, various nationalist thinkers including 
Gökalp were proposing all kinds of arguments for the coming era. As Gökalp was one of the 
influential voices, it was at least an intellectual possibility that Turkish secularism would 
have developed as the American separation model, which allows religious pluralism and 
religious symbols in public sphere. However, the Balkan War removed the possibility of 
pluralism, and a series of Caliphate-Islamists rebels against Atatürk’s liberation movement, a 
series of events which Kalaycıoğlu calls “the fourth front of the War of Liberation,”135 
lowered the desirability of the public presence of religion at all.
136
 I don’t suggest that 
Gökalp’s separation idea is better than Kemalism, or that Gökalp and Kemalists had shown a 
radical break against each other. Actually, one can find both continuity and discontinuity 
between Gökalp and Kemalists: Caliphate was abolished, but Directorate of Religious Affairs 
was established. Rather, I suggest that the existence of Gökalp’s separation idea provides a 
thick background to understand why Kemalists had turned assertive if they had to turn. It’s 
unlikely that they wanted to be assertive because they liked to be so as the militant secularists 
in France, but the unique, concrete historical context seems to compel them to be so. Gökalp 
can, in other words, attest the unwillingness to become assertive of the so-called militant 
secularists in the early Republic. 
Finishing my paper on Gökalp, I want to revisit that President Erdoğan recited the 
religious poems of Gökalp during a political rally in his early political career.
137
 I think 
Erdoğan’s recitation in this way damages Gökalp’s contribution. Among the many different 
genres of Gökalp, his poem is the most religious, often with hostility. Yet, a religious 
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politician, who would otherwise want to exemplify how to translate one’s religious opinions 
into public reason, ignored the important lesson from Gökalp, but picked up the opposite end 
of Gökalp’s contribution. To worsen the situation, the court decided to imprison Erdoğan for 
reciting Gökalp’s poems, a decision which also ignores the secular aspect of Gökalp but 
portrays him as a passionate religious poet. Had Gökalp been understood by all parties, would 
have Erdoğan recited him at all, and would have the court imprisoned anyone for reciting 
Gökalp in public sphere? Furthermore, Gökalp’s Islam and Erdoğan’s Islam seem very 
different from each other. For one thing, Gökalp’s religion is futuristic or transcendent, while 
Erdoğan’s emphasizes traditions and old fames. Also, Gökalp differentiates the degree of his 
religiosity according to different literature types, but Erdoğan seems to mingle his speech 
contexts, and uses religious expressions wherever and whenever, even in the critical 
diplomatic situation dealing with the terror group Islamic State.
138
 These contrasts between 
two individuals suggest that, even though Erdoğan was imprisoned for reciting Gökalp, he 
actually misquoted, so that the real contribution of Gökalp would be forgotten by both 
secularists and thoughtful Muslims, who view the separation principle being true to their 
religion as Gökalp. This is a sad loss. 
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